<DIV>>> What kinds of things would you use this for?</DIV>
<DIV>to hide from the cops<BR><BR><B><I>coderman <coderman@gmail.com></I></B> wrote:</DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=replbq style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid">I'm interested in using key predistribution for transitive<BR>introduction with strong identities. I have to echo Zooko's sentiment<BR>that the popularity of such methods in the kazaa crowd is not going to<BR>be high. I'm mainly interested in feasibility.<BR><BR>The way I have kludged this together is as follows:<BR><BR>1. Bootstrap with a live CD. you create an "identity" on a USB fob<BR>with AES256 loopback (knoppix).<BR><BR>2. Create a large number of RSA key pairs for use in transitive<BR>introduction. "large" may be 1,000 keys or 10M. (GnuPG)<BR><BR>3. Burn a copy of live CD for your friend(s). Each copy includes all<BR>of the public keys associated with your identity (for use with<BR>transitive introduction).<BR><BR>4. Friends bootstrap their CD (creating an identity if they don't have<BR>one) and can request connections from the peers with predistributed<BR>keys on the disc.
When a connection is requested the remote peer<BR>tells the client which of the predistributed keys to use. I let the<BR>remote peer select the key to use (via a simple offset, key #2048 for<BR>ex.) to prevent keys from being re-used.<BR><BR>5. These connections can in turn be used for secure transitive<BR>introduction to other peers.<BR><BR>The goal is to exchange keys "out of band" via DVD-R ISO images, with<BR>the cache of public predistributed keys appended to as the<BR>distribution is copied from friend to friend.<BR><BR>What kinds of things would you use this for?<BR><BR><BR><BR>On 2/23/05, Zooko O'Whielacronx <ZOOKO@ZOOKO.COM>wrote:<BR>> ...<BR>> This paper can be lossily compressed as: "Your scheme can handle up to<BR>> K malicious nodes. My attacker can bring K+1 malicious nodes to the<BR>> party.".<BR>> <BR>> ... <BR>> This implicit premise is that a connection between two node arises ex<BR>> nihilo. That is: for any three nodes A, B, and C, A has
(at the start)<BR>> no information about how B differs from C. This assumption is<BR>> obviously key to the whole issue. It is also obviously wrong!<BR>> <BR>> In practice the opposite is often true: for any three nodes A, B, and<BR>> C, A often has information distinguishing B from C. This is because A<BR>> has been introduced to B somehow, and that introduction gave A<BR>> information. (Likewise with A's introduction to C.)<BR>_______________________________________________<BR>p2p-hackers mailing list<BR>p2p-hackers@zgp.org<BR>http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers<BR>_______________________________________________<BR>Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:<BR>http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences<BR></BLOCKQUOTE><BR><BR>You don't get no juice unless you squeeze<br>Lemon Obrien, the Third.<p>__________________________________________________<br>Do You Yahoo!?<br>Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection
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