[Ietf-behave] Fwd: [p2p-hackers] Official IETF behavior recommendations for NATrelevant to P2P

[Lemon Obrien]

this security crap has to go. I think none of the major it companies have nothing to do; and i think it is the current fad.
 
its bad for business. its bad for consumers. its bad for america.
 
el

Saikat Guha <sg266 at cornell.edu> wrote:
On Wed, 2005-06-08 at 09:01 -0700, Bryan Ford wrote:
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Barrett [mailto:dbarrett at quinthar.com]

Hi David,

> So, to make a long story short, NAT traversal is a hard problem, and it's
> made especially hard by address-restricted NATs.
> If I could count on
> full-cone NAT behavior, my life as a programmer would be easier

Consider that NAT vendors have blatantly said that they _refuse_ to
implement full cone; mainly because of the importance of security in
Internet devices and market forces. IMHO, unless the draft absolutely
forbids non-full cone behavior, vendors that value security (as a
principle or as marketing hype) will continue to developing non-full
cone NATs. Regardless of the recommendations, developers will need to
support non-full cone behavior if they want to maximize connectivity;
there are ways to do this without adding all the complexity you
mentioned but thats a separate topic. The big difference between full
and non-full cone, I find, is less and more security respectively and
not in p2p connectivity or application support. 

-- 
Saikat




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You don't get no juice unless you squeeze
Lemon Obrien, the Third.
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