[p2p-hackers] DHT generalization for purposes other than network
performance
zooko at zooko.com
zooko at zooko.com
Thu Dec 8 15:28:58 UTC 2005
I'm going to paraphrase a blog entry I wrote some years ago and then mention
some newer research that is related.
In January 2003 [1] I wrote something like:
> Thanks to Peter Marbach for the discussion that prompted this insight.
>
> A network is defined on top of an underlying network. The first emergent
> networks (Chord), assumed that the underlying network was (a) fully
> connected and (b) homogeneous in the sense that any hop was considered to be
> just as expensive as any other hop. The most important contribution of
> Pastry (and then of Kademlia) is to treat the underlying network as
> heterogeneous, in the sense that some hops are considered more expensive
> that others. For Pastry, they chose to make these costs reflect network
> performance (i.e. latency or throughput) so that Pastry would optimize for
> faster routing (e.g. don't send packets through Japan when they are on their
> way from Canada to USA). For Kademlia, they chose to make these costs
> reflect uptime of peers in order to optimize for stability. So my big
> realization is:
>
> *** Trust (or vulnerability, or exposure) can also be modelled in the same
> way, as costs on the links of the underlying network.
>
> In addition, the underlying network may be incompletely connected, either
> because of (a) trust disconnects, (b) firewalls, NATs, censorship,
> terrorism, (c) the underlying network doesn't have complete routing e.g.
> wireless ad hoc networks.
>
> This encourages me a lot: the fact that mainstream emergent network
> researchers like Project IRIS might develop techniques for overlay networks
> to work on more general underlying networks (especially non-fully-
> connected), and that these techniques can then be applied to trust networks.
The recent research that I wanted to cite was Michael Freedman et al. analyzing
practical details of how current DHTs work atop non-fully-connected underlay
networks: [2].
[2] doesn't propose any good general solution, and indeed it speculates that a
fresh new DHT designed to handle non-fully-connected underlays may be needed.
Regards,
Zooko
[1] http://www.zooko.com/log-2003-01.html#d2003-01-23-trust_is_just_another_topology
[2] "Non-Transitive Connectivity and DHTs"
http://www.scs.cs.nyu.edu/~mfreed/publications/
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