[linux-elitists] Comprehensive list of Linux malware
Thu Dec 2 18:53:39 PST 2004
Aaron Sherman wrote:
>On Sat, 2004-11-20 at 11:05, Etienne Goyer wrote:
>>Mike MacCana wrote:
>>>- Executable files not used to package software
>>>Legitamite software is supplied as a package file that only needs to be
>>>read by an existing, trusted executable installation app (ie, up2date,
>>Considering package install script can do pretty much anything, and are
>>usually runned as root, this is a purely academic advantage. The trust
>>associated with signed package is a plus, but not a panacea either.
>It's also not true. While Linux purists may not be happy with it, one of
>the first things that most Linux and NVidia users do is download the
>binary-only NVidia driver from nvidia.com and execute it (it's a shell
That's the exception, not the rule. How many other major pieces of
software are provided as self extracting executables?
>There are also a number of shar archives from older systems (esp.
How many of those are still used today?
>and as you mentioned, a "package" is essentially a shell script
>+ tar ball (actually RPM as a specific example uses cpio not tar, but
Yes, but that's irrelevant. If it was a signed tarball and tar gave you
warnings/errors if it wasn't signed by someone you trust , you'd still
have the same benefit.
>Here's my list of why user security is higher under Linux:
> 1. Users are encouraged to work with a command-line and understand
> their system better.
True, but that's changing over time.
> 2. User separation (in concept and in practice) means that having
> access to a user account doesn't let you do many of the things
> that you might want (even more true with SELinux) as an
> 3. Windows. Seriously, Windows takes a lot of heat off of Linux.
> It's good not being the primary target of attacks.
> 4. Less low-level integration. Integration between applications
> happens at a fairly high level. This means that it is slightly
> more obvious to the developer of a piece of code that this code
> will have to deal with untrusted data. Under Windows, as a
> counter-example, the very low level integration between IE and
> the desktop makes this distinction harder.
> 5. Availability of a unified update scheme for supported,
> unsupported and third-party software.
> 6. Diversity of Linux implementations makes it a harder generic
> target than a monolithically controlled OS.
Agreed on all.
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